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Abstract: We study optimal stochastic control problems with jumps under model
uncertainty. We rewrite such problems as (zero-sum) stochastic differential games
of forward-backward stochastic differential equations. We prove general stochastic
maximum principles for such games, both in the zero-sum case (finding conditions
for saddle points) and for the non-zero sum games (finding conditions for Nash
equilibria). We then apply these results to study optimal portfolio and consumption
problems under model uncertainty. We combine the optimality conditions given
by the stochastic maximum principles with Malliavin calculus to obtain a set of
equations which determine the optimal strategies.
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Jeux différentiels stochastiques et contrôle
stochastique avec ambiguité de modèles
Résumé : On étudie des problèmes de contrôle stochastique de diffu-
sions avec sauts avec ambiguité de modèles, que l’on réécrit comme des jeux
différentiels stochastiques à somme nulle d’équations différentielles stochas-
tiques “forward-backward”. On démontre des principes du maximum sto-
chastiques généraux pour de tels jeux, à la fois dans le cas à somme nulle
(conditions d’existence de points selles) et dans le cas général (conditions
pour un équilibre de Nash). Ces résultats sont appliqués à l’étude de prob-
lèmes de portefeuilles et consommation optimale avec ambiguité de modèle.
En combinant les conditions d’optimalité obtenus par les principes du maxi-
mum stochastiques avec des techniques de calcul de Malliavin, on obtient la
caractérisation des stratégies optimales.
Mots-clés : Equations différentielles stochastiques forward et rétrogrades,
jeux différentiels stochastiques, principes du maximum stochastique, incerti-
tude de modèle, portefeuille optimal, diffusions avec sauts
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1 Introduction
One of the aftereffects of the financial crisis is the increased awareness of the
need for more advanced modeling in mathematical finance, and a focus of
attention is on the problem of model uncertainty. This paper is motivated
by a topic of this type. We consider a stochastic system described by a gen-
eral Itô-Lévy process controlled by an agent. The performance functional is
expressed as the Q-expectation of an integrated profit rate plus a terminal
payoff, where Q is a probability measure absolutely continuous with respect
to the original probability measure P . We may regard Q as a scenario mea-
sure controlled by the market or the environment. If Q = P the problem
becomes a classical stochastic control problem of the type studied in [15]. If
Q is uncertain, however, the agent might seek the strategy which maximizes
the performance in the worst possible choice of Q. This leads to a stochastic
differential game between the agent and the market. Our approach is the fol-
lowing: We write the performance functional as the value at time t = 0 of the
solution of an associated backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE).
Thus we arrive at a (zero sum) stochastic differential game of a system of
forward-backward SDEs (FBSDEs) that we study by the maximum principle
approach.
There are several papers of related content. Stochastic control of forward-
backward SDEs (FBSDEs) has been studied in [16] and in [2] a maximum
principle for stochastic differential g-expectation games of SDEs is developed.
The papers [11], [18] and [19] also study optimal portfolio under model un-
certainty by means of BSDEs, but the approaches there are strongly linked
to the exponential utility case. A key feature of the current paper is that it
applies to general utility functions and also general dynamics for the state
process.
Our paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we state general stochas-
tic maximum principles for stochastic differential games, both in the zero-
sum case (finding conditions for saddle points) and for the non-zero sum
games (finding conditions for Nash equilibria). The proofs are given in Ap-
pendix A. In Section 3 we consider stochastic control problems under un-
certainty. We formulate these problems as (zero sum) stochastic differential
games of forward-backward SDEs (FBSDEs) and we study them by the maxi-
mum principle approach of Section 2. In Section 4 we apply these techniques
to study an optimal portfolio and consumption problem under model un-
certainty. Using the solution for linear Malliavin–differential type equations
given in [16] we arrive at a set of equations which determine the optimal port-
folio and consumption of the agent and the corresponding optimal portfolio
scenario measure of the market.
RR n° 7776
Forward-backward SDE games and stochastic control under model uncertainty 4
2 Maximum principles for stochastic differen-
tial games of forward-backward stochastic dif-
ferential equations
In this section, we formulate and prove a sufficient and a necessary maximum
principle for general stochastic differential games (not necessarily zero-sum
games) of forward-backward SDEs. Let (Ω, {Ft}t≥0, P ) be a filtered proba-
bility space. Consider a controlled forward SDE of the form
dX(t) = dX(u)(t) = b(t,X(t), u(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), u(t))dB(t)
+
∫
R
γ(t,X(t), u(t), ζ)N˜(dt, dζ) ; X(0) = x ∈ R. (2.1)
where B is a Brownian motion, and N˜(dt, dζ) = N(dt, dζ) − ν(dζ)dt is an
independent compensated Poisson random measure where ν is the Lévy mea-
sure of N such that
∫
R
ζ2ν(dζ) < ∞. We assume that IF = {Ft, t ≥ 0} is
the natural filtration associated with B and N . Here u = (u1, u2), where
ui(t) is the control of player i ; i = 1, 2. We assume that we are given two
subfiltrations
E
(i)
t ⊆ Ft ; t ∈ [0, T ], (2.2)
representing the information available to player i at time t ; i = 1, 2. We let
Ai denote a given set of admissible control processes for player i, contained
in the set of E
(i)
t -predictable processes ; i = 1, 2, with values in Ai ⊂ R
d,
d ≥ 1. Denote U = A1 × A2.
We consider the associated backward SDE’s (i.e. BSDEs) in the un-
knowns Yi(t), Zi(t), Ki(t, ζ) of the form
dYi(t) = −gi(t,X(t), Yi(t), Zi(t), Ki(t, ·), u(t))dt
+ Zi(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
Ki(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Yi(T ) = hi(X(T )) ; i = 1, 2. (2.3)
Here gi(t, y, z, k, u) : [0, T ] × R × R × R × U → R and hi : R → R are
given functions such that the BSDEs (2.3) have unique solutions.
Let fi(t, x, u) : [0, T ] × R × U → R, ϕi(x) : R → R and ψi(x) : R → R
be given profit rates, bequest functions and “risk evaluations” respectively,
of player i ; i = 1, 2. Define
Ji(u) = E
[∫ T
0
fi(t,X
(u)(t), u(t))dt+ ϕi(X
(u)(T )) + ψi(Yi(0))
]
; i = 1, 2,
(2.4)
RR n° 7776
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provided the integrals and expectations exist. We call Ji(u) the performance
functional of player i ; i = 1, 2.
A Nash equilibrium for the FBSDE game (2.1)-(2.4) is a pair (uˆ1, uˆ2) ∈
A1 ×A2 such that
J1(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u1 ∈ A1 (2.5)
and
J2(uˆ1, u2) ≤ J2(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u2 ∈ A2. (2.6)
Heuristically this means that player i has no incentive to deviate from
the control uˆi, as long as player j (j 6= i) does not deviate from uˆj ; i =
1, 2. Therefore a Nash equilibrium is in some cases a likely outcome of a
game. We now present a method to find it, based on the maximum principle
for stochastic control. Our result may be regarded as an extension of the
maximum principles for FBSDEs in [16] and for (forward) SDE games in [2].
Define the Hamiltonians
Hi(t, x, y, z, k, u1, u2, λ, p, q, r) : [0, T ]×R×R×R×R×A1×A2×R×R×R×R → R
of this game by
Hi(t, x, y, z, k,u1, u2, λ, p, q, r) = fi(t, x, u1, u2) + λgi(t, x, y, z, k, u1, u2) + pb(t, x, u1, u2)
+ qσ(t, x, u1, u2) +
∫
R
r(ζ)γ(t, x, u1, u2, ζ)ν(dζ) ; i = 1, 2,
(2.7)
where R is the set of functions from R0 into R such that the integral in (2.7)
converges.
We assume thatHi is Fréchet differentiable (C
1) in the variables x, y, z, k, u
i=1,2.
In the following, we are using the shorthand notation
∂Hi
∂y
(t) =
∂Hi
∂y
(t,X(t), Yi(t), Zi(t), Ki(t, ·), u1(t), u2(t), λi(t), pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ·))
and similarly for the other partial derivatives of Hi.
To these Hamiltonians we associate a system of FBSDEs in the adjoint
processes λi(t), pi(t), qi(t) and ri(t, ζ) as follows:
(i) Forward SDE in λi(t):

dλi(t) =
∂Hi
∂y
(t)dt+
∂Hi
∂z
(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
∇kHi(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
λi(0) = ψ
′
i(Yi(0))
(
=
dψi
dy
(Yi(0))
)
.
(2.8)
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(ii) Backward SDE in pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ζ):
dpi(t) = −
∂Hi
∂x
(t)dt+ qi(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
ri(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
pi(T ) = ϕ
′
i(X(T )) + h
′
i(X(T ))λi(T ).
(2.9)
See Appendix A for an explanation of the gradient operator ∇kHi(t, ζ) =
∇kHi(t, ζ)(·).
Theorem 2.1 (Sufficient maximum principle for FBSDE games) Let
(uˆ1, uˆ2) ∈ A1×A2 with corresponding solutions Xˆ(t), Yˆi(t), Zˆi(t), Kˆi(t), λˆi(t), pˆi(t), qˆi(t), rˆi(t, ζ)
of equations (2.1), (2.3), (2.8) and (2.9) for i = 1, 2. Suppose that the fol-
lowing holds:
• (Concavity I) The functions x → hi(x), x → ϕi(x), x → ψi(x) are
concave, i = 1,2.
• (The conditional maximum principle)
maxv∈A1{E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·), v, uˆ2(t), λˆ1(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, ·)) | E
(1)
t ] ;
= E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·), uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t), λˆ1(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, ·)) | E
(1)
t ]
(2.10)
and similarly
maxv∈A2{E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ2(t), Zˆ2(t), Kˆ2(t, ·), u1(t), v, λˆ2(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t), rˆ2(t, ·)) | E
(2)
t ] ;
= E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ2(t), Zˆ2(t), Kˆ2(t, ·), uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t), λˆ2(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t), rˆ2(t, ·)) | E
(2)
t ]
(2.11)
• (Concavity II) (The Arrow conditions). The functions
hˆ1(x, y, z, k) := max
v1∈A1
E[H1(t, x, y, z, k, v1, uˆ2(t), λˆ1(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, ·)) | E
(1)
t ],
and
hˆ2(x, y, z, k) := max
v2∈A2
E[H2(t, x, y, z, k, uˆ1(t), v2, λˆ2(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t), rˆ2(t, ·)) | E
(2)
t ]
are concave for all t, a.s.
RR n° 7776
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• Moreover, assume the following growth conditions hold:
E
[∫ T
0
{
pˆ2i (t)
[
(σ(t)− σˆ(t))2 +
∫
R
(r(t, ζ)− rˆ(t, ζ))2ν(dζ)
]
+ (X(t)− Xˆ(t))2
[
qˆ2i (t) +
∫
R
rˆ2i (t, ζ)ν(dζ)
]
+ (Yi(t)− Yˆi(t))
2


(
∂Hˆi
∂z
)2
(t) +
∫
R
∥∥∥∇kHˆi(t, ζ)∥∥∥2 ν(dζ)


+λˆ21(t)
[
(Zi(t)− Zˆi(t))
2 +
∫
R
(Ki(t, ζ)− Kˆi(t, ζ))
2ν(dζ)
]}
dt
]
<∞ for i = 1, 2.
(2.12)
Then uˆ(t) = (uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t)) is a Nash equilibrium for (2.1)-(2.4).
Remark 2.2 Above we have used the following shorthand notation:
If i = 1, then X(t) = X(u1,uˆ2)(t) and Y1(t) = Y
(u1,uˆ2)
1 (t) are the processes
corresponding to the control u(t) = (u1(t), uˆ2(t)), while Xˆ(t) = X
(uˆ)(t) and
Yˆ1(t) = Y
(uˆ)
1 (t) are those corresponding to the control uˆ(t) = (uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t)).
An analogue notation is used for i = 2.
Moreover, we put
∂Hˆi
∂x
(t) =
∂Hi
∂x
(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆi(t), Zˆi(t), Kˆi(t, ·), uˆ(t), λˆi(t), pˆi(t), qˆi(t), rˆi(t, ·))
and similarly with
∂Hˆi
∂z
(t) and ∇kHˆi(t, ζ), i = 1, 2.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
It is also of interest to prove a version of the maximum principle which
does not require the concavity conditions. One such version is the following
necessary maximum principle (Theorem 2.3) which requires the following
RR n° 7776
Forward-backward SDE games and stochastic control under model uncertainty 8
assumptions:
• For all t0 ∈ [0, T ] and all bounded, E
(i)
t -measurable random variables αi(ω),
the control βi(t) := χ(t0,T )(t)αi(ω) belongs to Ai ; i = 1, 2 (2.13)
• For all ui, βi ∈ Ai with βi bounded there exists δi > 0 such that the control
u˜i(t) := ui(t) + sβi(t) ; t ∈ [0, T ] belongs to Ai for all s ∈ (−δi, δi) ; i = 1, 2.
(2.14)
• The following derivative processes exist and belong to L2([0, T ]× Ω) :
(2.15)
x1(t) =
d
ds
X(u1+sβ1,u2)(t) |s=0 ; y1(t) =
d
ds
Y
(u1+sβ1,u2)
1 (t) |s=0
z1(t) =
d
ds
Z
(u1+sβ1,u2)
1 (t) |s=0 ; k1(t, ζ) =
d
ds
K
(u1+sβ1,u2)
1 (t) |s=0
and, similarly x2(t) =
d
ds
X(u1,u2+sβ2)(t) |s=0 etc.
Note that since X(u)(0) = x for all u we have xi(0) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
In the following we write
∂b
∂x
(t) for
∂b
∂x
(t,X(t), u(t)) etc.
By (2.1) and (2.3) we have
dx1(t) =
{
∂b
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂b
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
}
dt+
{
∂σ
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂σ
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
}
dB(t)
+
∫
R
{
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)x1(t) +
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)β1(t)
}
N˜(dt, dζ), (2.16)
dy1(t) = −
{
∂g1
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂g1
∂y
(t)y1(t) +
∂g1
∂z
(t)z1(t)
+
∫
R
∇kg1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)ν(dζ) +
∂g1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
}
dt
+ zi(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
k1(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
y1(T ) = h
′
1(X
(u1,u2)(T ))x1(T ), (2.17)
and similarly for dx2(t), dy2(t).
We are now ready to state a necessary maximum principle, which is an
extension of Theorem 3.1 in [2] and Theorem 3.1 in [16]. In the sequel, ∂H
∂v
means ∇vH.
RR n° 7776
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Theorem 2.3 (Necessary maximum principle) Suppose u ∈ A with cor-
responding solutions X(t), Yi(t), Zi(t), Ki(t, ζ), λi(t), pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ζ) of equa-
tions (2.1), (2.3), (2.8) and (2.9). Suppose (2.13), (2.14) and (2.15) hold.
Moreover, assume that
E
[∫ T
0
{
p2i (t)
[(
∂σ
∂x
(t)xi(t) +
∂σ
∂ui
(t)βi(t)
)2
+
∫
R
(
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)xi(t) +
∂γ
∂ui
(t, ζ)βi(t)
)2
ν(dζ)
]
+ x2i (t)(q
2
i (t) +
∫
R
r2i (t, ζ)ν(dζ))
+ λ2i (t)(z
2
i (t) +
∫
R
k2i (t, ζ)ν(dζ))
+y2i (t)
(
(
∂Hi
∂z
)2(t) +
∫
R
‖∇kHi(t, ζ)‖
2
ν(dζ)
)}]
dt <∞ for i = 1, 2.
(2.18)
Then the following are equivalent:
(i)
d
ds
J1(u1 + sβ1, u2) |s=0=
d
ds
J2(u1, u2 + sβ2) |s=0= 0
for all bounded β1 ∈ A1, β2 ∈ A2.
(ii)
E
[
∂
∂v1
H1(t,X(t), Y1(t), Z1(t), K1(t, ·), v1, u2(t), λ1(t), p1(t)q1(t), r1(t, ·)) | E
(1)
t
]
v1=u1(t)
= E
[
∂
∂v2
H2(t,X(t), Y2(t), Z2(t), K2(t, ·), u1(t), v2, λ2(t), p2(t), q2(t), r2(t, ·)) | E
(2)
t
]
v2=u2(t)
= 0.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The zero-sum game case. In the zero-sum case we have
J1(u1, u2) + J2(u1, u2) = 0. (2.19)
RR n° 7776
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Then the Nash equilibrium (uˆ1, uˆ2) ∈ A1×A2 satisfying (2.5)-(2.6) becomes
a saddle point for J(u1, u2) := J1(u1, u2). To see this, note that (2.5)-(2.6)
imply that
J1(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) = −J2(uˆ1, uˆ2) ≤ −J2(uˆ1, u2)
and hence
J(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J(uˆ1, uˆ2) ≤ J(uˆ1, u2) for all u1, u2.
From this we deduce that
inf
u2∈A2
sup
u1∈A1
J(u1, u2) ≤ sup
u1∈A1
J(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J(uˆ1, uˆ2)
≤ inf
u2∈A2
J(uˆ1, u2) ≤ sup
u1∈A1
inf
u2∈A2
J(u1, u2). (2.20)
Since we always have inf sup ≥ sup inf, we conclude that
inf
u2∈A2
sup
u1∈A1
J(u1, u2) = sup
u1∈A1
J(u1, uˆ2) = J(uˆ1, uˆ2)
= inf
u2∈A2
J(uˆ1, u2) = sup
u1∈A1
inf
u2∈A2
J(u1, u2). (2.21)
i.e. (uˆ1, uˆ2) ∈ A1 ×A2 is a saddle point for J(u1, u2).
We now state the necessary maximum principle for the zero sum game
problem:
Choose gi = g, hi = h, f1 = f = −f2, ϕ1 = ϕ = −ϕ2 and ψ1 = ψ =
−ψ2 ; i = 1, 2. For u = (u1, u2) ∈ A1 ×A2 define
J(u1, u2) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X(u)(t), u(t))dt+ ϕ(X(u)(T )) + ψ(Y (0))
]
, (2.22)
where X(u)(t), Y (t) = Yi(t), Z(t) = Zi(t) and K(t, ζ) = Ki(t, ζ) are defined
by (2.1) and (2.3). In this case only one Hamiltonian is needed, namely (see
(2.7)):
H(t, x, y, z, k, u1, u2, λ, p, q, r) = f(t, x, u1, u2) + λg(t, x, y, z, k, u1, u2) + pb(t, x, u1, u2)
+ qσ(t, x, u1, u2) +
∫
R
r(ζ)γ(t, x, u1, u2, ζ)ν(dζ).
(2.23)
Let λ = λi, p = pi, q = qi and r = ri i = 1, 2 be as in (2.8)-(2.9).
Theorem 2.4 (Necessary maximum principle for zero-sum forward-backward games)
Assume the conditions of Theorem 2.3 hold. Then the following are equiva-
lent:
RR n° 7776
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(i)
d
ds
J(u1 + sβ1, u2) |s=0=
d
ds
J(u1, u2 + sβ2) |s=0= 0 (2.24)
for all bounded β1 ∈ A1, β2 ∈ A2.
(ii)
E
[
∂
∂v1
H(t,X(t), Y (t), Z(t), K(t, ·), v1, u2(t), λ(t), p(t), q(t), r(t, ·)) | E
(1)
t
]
v1=u1(t)
= E
[
∂
∂v2
H(t,X(t), Y (t), Z(t), K(t, ·), u1(t), v2, λ(t), p(t), q(t), r(t, ·)) | E
(2)
t
]
v2=u2(t)
= 0. (2.25)
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.3 and is omitted. 
Corollary 2.5 Let u = (u1, u2) ∈ A1 × A2 be a Nash equilibrium (saddle
point) for the zero-sum game in Theorem 2.4. Then (2.25) holds.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2.4 by noting that if u = (u1, u2) is a
Nash equilibrium, then (2.24) holds by (2.21). 
Similarly we get
Theorem 2.6 [Sufficient maximum principle for zero-sum forward-backward
games]
Let H(t, x, y, z, k, u1, u2, λ, p, q, r) be as in (2.25). Let (uˆ1, uˆ2) ∈ A1 ×
A2, with corresponding solutions Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Zˆ(t), Kˆ(t), λˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, ζ)
of equation (2.1), (2.2), (2.8) and (2.9) for gi = g, hi = h, fi = f, ϕi = ϕ and
ψi = ψ. Suppose the following holds
• The functions
x→ h(x), x→ ϕ(x) and x→ ψ(x) (2.26)
are affine.
• (The conditional maximum principle)
max
v1∈A1
E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Zˆ(t), Kˆ(t, ·), v1, uˆ2(t), λˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, ·)) | E
(1)
t ]
= E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Zˆ(t), Kˆ(t, ·), uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t), λˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, ·)) | E
(1)
t ]
(2.27)
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and
min
v2∈A2
E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Zˆ(t), Kˆ(t, ·), uˆ1(t), v2, λˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, ·)) | E
(2)
t ]
= E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Zˆ(t), Kˆ(t, ·), uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t), λˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, ·)) | E
(2)
t ].
(2.28)
• (The Arrow conditions) The function
hˆ(x, y, z, k) := max
v1∈A1
E[H(t, x, y, z, k, v1, uˆ2(t), λˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, ·)) | E
(1)
t ]
is concave, and the function
∨
h (x, y, z, k) := min
v2∈A2
E[H(t, x, y, z, k, uˆ1(t), v2, λˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, ·)) | E
(2)
t ]
is convex, for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
• The growth condition (2.14) holds with pi = p etc.
Then uˆ(t) = (uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t)) is a saddle point for J(u1, u2).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.1 and is omitted. 
3 Stochastic control under model uncertainty
Let X(t) = Xvx(t) be a controlled Itô–Lévy process of the form
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), v(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), v(t))dB(t)
+
∫
R
γ(t,X(t), v(t), ζ)N˜(dt, dζ) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
X(0) = x ∈ R (3.1)
where v(·) is the control process.
We consider a model uncertainty setup, represented by a probability mea-
sure Q = Qθ which is equivalent to P , with the Radon-Nikodym derivative
on Ft given by
d(Q | Ft)
d(P | Ft)
= Gθ(t) (3.2)
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where, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , Gθ(t) is a martingale of the form
dGθ(t) = Gθ(t−)[θ0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
θ1(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)]
Gθ(0) = 1. (3.3)
Here θ = (θ0, θ1) may be regarded as a scenario control. Let A1 denote a
given family of admissible controls v and A2 denote a given set of admissible
scenario controls θ such that E[
∫ T
0
{|θ20(t)| +
∫
R
θ21(t, ζ)ν(dζ)}dt] < ∞ and
θ1(t, ζ) ≥ −1+ǫ for some ǫ > 0. Let E
(1)
0≤t≤T and E
(2)
0≤t≤T be given subfiltrations
of F0≤t≤T , representing the information available to the controllers at time t.
It is required that v ∈ A1 be E
1
t -predictable, and θ ∈ A2 be E
2
t -predictable.
We consider the stochastic differential game to find (vˆ, θˆ) ∈ A1 × A2 such
that
sup
v∈A1
inf
θ∈A2
EQθ [W (v, θ)] = EQθˆ [W (vˆ, θˆ)] = infθ∈A2
sup
v∈A1
EQθ [W (v, θ)], (3.4)
where
W (v, θ) = U2(X
v(T )) +
∫ T
0
U1(s,X
v(s), v(s))ds+
∫ T
0
ρ(θ(t))dt. (3.5)
Here, U1 : [0, T ]×R×V → R and U2 : R → R are given functions, concave and
increasing with a strictly decreasing derivative, and ρ is a convex function.
The term Λ(θ) := EQθ [
∫ T
0
ρ(θ(t))dt] can be seen as a penalty term, penalizing
the difference between Qθ and the original probability measure P .
Put
F (t, x, u) = U1(t, x, v) + ρ(θ); u = (v, θ) = (c, π, θ0, θ1). (3.6)
Then
EQθ [W (v, θ)] = E[G
θ(T )U2(X
v(T )) +
∫ T
0
Gθ(s)F (s,Xv(s), u(s))ds]. (3.7)
We now define Y (t) = Y v,θ(t) by
Y (t) = E[
Gθ(T )
Gθ(t)
U2(X
v(T )) +
∫ T
t
Gθ(s)
Gθ(t)
F (s,Xv(s), u(s))ds | Ft]; t ∈ [0, T ].
(3.8)
Then we recognize Y (t) as the solution of the linear BSDE (see Lemma B.1)
dY (t) = −[F (t,Xv(t), u(t)) + θ0(t)Z(t) +
∫
R
θ1(t, ζ)K(t, ζ)ν(dζ)]dt
+ Z(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
K(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ); 0 ≤ t ≤ T (3.9)
Y (T ) = U2(X
v(T )).
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Note that
Y (0) = Y v,θ(0) = EQθ [W (v, θ)]. (3.10)
Therefore the problem (3.4) can be written
sup
v∈A1
inf
θ∈A2
Y v,θ(0) = Y vˆ,θˆ(0) = inf
θ∈A2
sup
v∈A1
Y v,θ(0), (3.11)
where Y v,θ(t) is given by the forward-backward system (3.1) & (3.9). This is
a zero-sum stochastic differential game (SDG) of forward-backward SDEs of
the form (2.22) with f = ϕ = 0 and ψ = Id.
Proceeding as in Section 2, define the Hamiltonian
H : [0, T ]× R× R× R0 ×R× A1 × A2 × R× R× R×R → R
by
H(t, x, y, z, k, v, θ, λ, p, q, r) = [F (t, x, u) + θ0z +
∫
R
θ1(ζ)k(ζ)ν(dζ)]λ
+b(t, x, v)p+ σ(t, x, v)q +
∫
R
γ(t, x, v, ζ)r(ζ)ν(dζ).
(3.12)
where R is the set of functions r : R0 → R such that (3.12) converge. Define
a pair of FBSDEs in the adjoint processes λ(t), p(t), q(t), r(t, ζ) as follows:
Forward SDE for λ(t):
dλ(t) =
∂H
∂y
(t)dt+
∂H
∂z
(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
∇kH(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)
= λ(t)θ0(t)dB(t) + λ(t)
∫
R
θ1(t, ζ)(·)N˜(dt, dζ); t ∈ [0, T ]
λ(0) = 1 (3.13)
Backward SDE for p(t), q(t), r(t, ζ):
dp(t) = −
∂H
∂x
(t)dt+ q(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
r(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)
= −{
∂F
∂x
(t) + p(t)
∂b
∂x
(t) + q(t)
∂σ
∂x
(t) +
∫
R
r(t, ζ)
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)ν(dζ)}dt
+ q(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
r(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ); t ∈ [0, T ]
p(T ) = λ(T )U ′2(X(T )). (3.14)
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Here we have used the abbreviated notation
∂H
∂y
(t) =
∂H
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), Z(t), K(t, ·), v(t), θ(t), λ(t), p(t), q(t), r(t, ·))
and similarly for the other partial derivatives. We now present a necessary
maximum principle for the forward-backward stochastic differential game
(3.1), (3.9), (3.11) by adapting Theorem 2.4 to this case.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 2.3 hold. Let (vˆ, θˆ) ∈
A1×A2, with corresponding solutions Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Zˆ(t), Kˆ(t, ·), λˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, ·)
of equations (3.1), (3.9), (3.14) and (3.13). Suppose (3.11) holds, together
with (2.12). Then the following holds:
E[λˆ(t)
∂U1
∂v
(t, Xˆ(t), vˆ(t)) + pˆ(t)
∂b
∂v
(t, Xˆ(t), vˆ(t))
+qˆ(t)
∂σ
∂v
(t, Xˆ(t), vˆ(t)) +
∫
R
rˆ(t, ζ)
∂γ
∂v
(t, Xˆ(t), vˆ(t), ζ)ν(dζ) | E
(1)
t ] = 0
E[λˆ(t)(
∂ρ
∂θ0
(θˆ(t)) + Zˆ(t)) | E
(2)
t ] = 0
E[λˆ(t)(∇θ1F (t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t)) +
∫
R
(·)Kˆ(t, ζ)ν(dζ)) | E
(2)
t ] = 0.
Note that both ∇θ1F and
∫
R
(·)Kˆ(t, ζ)ν(dζ) are linear functionals, the latter
being defined by the action
ϕ→
∫
R
ϕ(ζ)Kˆ(t, ζ)ν(dζ)
for all bounded continuous functions ϕ : R0 7→ R.
4 Portfolio and consumption problem under model
uncertainty
We now apply this to the following portfolio and consumption problem under
model uncertainty. Consider a financial market consisting of a bond with unit
price S0(t) = 1 ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T, and a stock, with unit price S(t) given by
dS(t) = S(t−)[b0(t)dt+ σ0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
γ0(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)], (4.1)
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where b0(t) = b0(t, ω), σ0(t) = σ0(t, ω) and γ0(t, ζ) = γ0(t, ζ, ω) are given
{Ft}-predictable processes such that γ0 ≥ −1 + ǫ for some ǫ > 0 and
E[
∫ T
0
{|b0(t)|+ σ
2
0(t) +
∫
R
γ20(t, ζ)ν(dζ)}dt] <∞.
Note that this system is non–Markovian since the coefficients are random
processes.
We introduce the state price density Γ(t) defined by
Γ(t) := exp(
∫ t
0
−
b0(s)
σ0(s)
dB(s)−
1
2
∫ t
0
(
b0(s)
σ0(s)
)2ds). (4.2)
Let X(t) = Xv(t) be the wealth process corresponding to a portfolio π(t)
and a consumption rate c(t), i.e.{
dX(t) = π(t)[b0(t)dt+ σ0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
γ0(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)]− c(t)dt, t ∈ [0, T ]
X(0) = x ∈ R,
(4.3)
and put v = (π, c). We consider the stochastic differential game (3.4)-(3.5).
For i = 1, 2, Ii will denote the inverse of U
′
i , in the sense that
Ii(y) =
{
(U ′i)
−1(y); 0 ≤ y ≤ yi
0 y > yi
(4.4)
where yi = limx→0+ U
′
i(x). We assume that ρ
′(θ) has an inverse.
We have seen in Section 3, that the problem (3.4)-(3.5) can be written as
sup
v∈A1
inf
θ∈A2
Y v,θ(0) = Y vˆ,θˆ(0) = inf
θ∈A2
sup
v∈A1
Y v,θ(0), (4.5)
where Y (t) = Y v,θ(t) is given by equation (3.9) and (4.3).
We now apply the necessary maximum principle given by Theorem 3.1.
The Hamiltonian for the problem (4.5) is, by (3.12),
H(t, x, y, z, k, v, θ, λ, p, q, r) = [U1(t, c) + ρ(θ) + θ0z +
∫
R
θ1(ζ)k(ζ)ν(dζ)]λ
+(πb0(t)− c)p+ πσ0(t)q + π
∫
R
γ0(t, ζ)r(ζ)ν(dζ).
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The forward SDE for λ(t) = λθ(t) and the BSDE for p(t), q(t), r(t, ζ) are (see
(3.13)- (3.14))
dλ(t) = λ(t)[θ0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
θ1(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)]; t ∈ [0, T ]
λ(0) = 1 (4.6)
dp(t) = q(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
r(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dz); t ∈ [0, T ]
p(T ) = λ(T )U ′2(X(T )). (4.7)
Maximizing H with respect to (c, π) gives the following first order conditions:
E[λ(t) | E
(1)
t ]
∂U1
∂c
(t, c(t)) = E[p(t) | E
(1)
t ] (4.8)
E[b0(t)p(t) + σ0(t)q(t) +
∫
R
γ0(t, ζ)r(t, ζ)ν(dζ) | E
(1)
t ] = 0 (4.9)
Minimizing H with respect to θ = (θ0, θ1) gives the following first order
conditions:
∂ρ
∂θ0
(θ(t)) + E[Z(t) | E
(2)
t ] = 0 (4.10)
∇θ1ρ(θ(t))(·) + E[
∫
R
(·)K(t, ζ)ν(dζ) | E
(2)
t ] = 0 (4.11)
We now restrict ourselves to the case when there are no jumps, i.e. N˜ =
ν = K = θ1 = 0 and E
(1)
t = E
(2)
t = Ft. For simplicity of notation, we write θ
instead of θ0. Then equations (4.6)-(4.11) simplify to:
λ(t) = exp(
∫ t
0
θ(s)dB(s)−
∫ t
0
1
2
θ2(s)ds) (4.12)
p(t) = E[λ(T )U ′2(X(T )) | Ft] ; (4.13)
λ(t)
∂U1
∂c
(t, c(t)) = p(t) (4.14)
b0(t)p(t) + σ0(t)q(t) = 0 (4.15)
ρ′(θ(t)) + Z(t) = 0 (4.16)
and by the generalized Clark-Ocone formula [1],
q(t) = E[Dt(λ(T )U
′
2(X(T ))) | Ft], (4.17)
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where Dt denotes the Malliavin derivative at t with respect to B(·). (See e.g.
[7]).
The FBSDEs (4.3)-(3.9) simplify to:
dX(t) = π(t)[b0(t)dt+ σ0(t)dB(t)]− c(t)dt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
X(0) = x > 0 (4.18)
dY (t) = −[U1(t, c(t)) + ρ(θ(t)) + θ(t)Z(t)]dt+ Z(t)dB(t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Y (T ) = U2(X(T )). (4.19)
Put
R = p(T ) = λ(T )U ′2(X(T )). (4.20)
Then (4.15) can be written
b0(t)E[R | Ft] + σ0(t)E[DtR | Ft] = 0. (4.21)
Following [16] we call this a Malliavin-differential type equation in the un-
known random variable R. By Theorem A.1 in [16], the general solution of
this equation is R = Rβ(T ); where
Rβ(t) = βΓ(t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (4.22)
for some constant β, where Γ(t) is defined in (4.2). Note that Rβ(t) is a
martingale. Hence since p(T ) = Rβ(T ), we get by (4.13) that
p(t) = Rβ(t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.23)
Modulo the unknown constant β we can now find the optimal terminal wealth
Xβ(T ) by (4.20) as follows:
Xβ(T ) = I2(
βΓ(T )
λ(T )
), (4.24)
Similarly the optimal consumption rate is, by (4.14),
c(t) = cβ(t) = I1(t,
βΓ(t)
λ(t)
); 0 ≤ t ≤ T (4.25)
The optimal scenario parameter is, by (4.16)
θ(t) = θβ(t) = (ρ′)−1(−Zβ(t)); 0 ≤ t ≤ T (4.26)
where (Yβ(t), Zβ(t)) is the solution of the corresponding BSDE (4.19), i.e.
dYβ(t) = −[U1(t, cβ(t)) + ρ(θ(t)) + θ(t)Zβ(t)]dt+ Zβ(t)dB(t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Yβ(T ) = U2(I2(
βΓ(T )
λ(T )
)). (4.27)
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Let us consider the case when
U1 = c = 0 (no consumption) and ρ(θ) =
1
2
θ2. (4.28)
Substituting (4.26) into (4.27), we get
dYβ(t) =
1
2
θ2(t)dt− θ(t)dB(t) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Yβ(T ) = U2(I2(
βΓ(T )
λ(T )
)).
(4.29)
Integrating (4.29), and using (4.12) at t = T , we get
−
1
2
∫ T
0
θ2(s)ds+
∫ T
0
θ(s)dB(s) = Yβ(0)− U2(I2(
β Γ(T )
λ(T )
)). (4.30)
Taking exponentials in (4.30) we obtain
λ(T ) = exp
(∫ T
0
θ(s)dB(s)−
1
2
∫ T
0
θ2(s)ds
)
=
expYβ(0)
exp(U2(I2(
β Γ(T )
λ(T )
)))
.
(4.31)
Therefore λ(t) is given as the solution of the BSDE (or more precisely SDE
with terminal condition){
dλ(t) = λ(t)θ(t)dB(t) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
λθ(T ) = L
(4.32)
where L = L(β, Yβ(0)) is the solution of the equation:
L exp(U2(I2(
β Γ(T )
L
))) = expYβ(0). (4.33)
By the generalized Clark-Ocone formula [1] this gives
λ(t)θ(t) = E[DtL | Ft] ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.34)
By (4.6) and (4.34), we have:{
dλ(t) = E[DtL | Ft]dB(t) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
λ(0) = 1
(4.35)
and
θ(t) =
E[DtL | Ft]
λ(t)
; 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.36)
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Note that E[L] = 1 by the martingale property of λ(t).
It remains to determine β and Yβ(0). To this end, we consider the equa-
tion (4.18) for X(t) as a BSDE as follows:
Put
Z˜β(t) = π(t)σ0(t).
Then
π(t) =
Z˜β(t)
σ0(t)
(4.37)
and (4.18) becomes, using (4.24),
dX(t) =
b0(t)
σ0(t)
Z˜β(t)dt+ Z˜β(t)dB(t); (4.38)
X(T ) = I2(
β Γ(T )
L
). (4.39)
The solution of this linear BSDE is
X(t) = E[I2(
β Γ(T )
L
) exp(
∫ T
t
−
1
2
(
b0(s)
σ0(s)
)2ds−
∫ T
t
b0(s)
σ0(s)
dB(s)) | Ft]
= E[I2(
β Γ(T )
L
)
Γ(T )
Γ(t)
| Ft]. (4.40)
In particular, putting t = 0, we get
x = E[I2(
β Γ(T )
L
)Γ(T )]. (4.41)
Finally, by taking expectation in (4.30), we deduce that
Yβ(0) = E
[
U2(I2(
β Γ(T )
L
))−
1
2
∫ T
0
θ2(s))ds
]
(4.42)
which, together with (4.41) gives the value of β and the solution Yβ(0) =
Y pˆi,θˆ(0) of (3.11).
We summarize what we have proved
Theorem 4.1 Consider the problem to find (πˆ, θˆ) such that
sup
pi∈A1
inf
θ∈A2
EQθ [W (v, θ)] = EQθˆ [W (πˆ, θˆ)] = infθ∈A2
sup
v∈A1
EQθ [W (π, θ)], (4.43)
with
W (π, θ) = U2(X
pi(T )) +
∫ T
0
θ(t)2dt (4.44)
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where
dX(t) = π(t)[b0(t)dt+ σ0(t)dB(t)], 0 ≤ t ≤ T
X(0) = x > 0. (4.45)
This problem is equivalent to
sup
pi∈A1
inf
θ∈A2
Y pi,θ(0) = Y pˆi,θˆ(0) = inf
θ∈A2
sup
pi∈A1
Y v,θ(0), (4.46)
where Y = Y pi,θ is given by
dY (t) = −[
1
2
θ(t)2 + θ(t)Z(t)]dt+ Z(t)dB(t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Y (T ) = U2(X(T )). (4.47)
Then, the optimal scenario parameter is
θˆ = E[DtL | Ft](1 +
∫ t
0
E[DsL | Fs]dB(s))
−1.
The optimal portfolio πˆ is given by
πˆ =
DtXˆ(t)
σ0(t)
where Xˆ(t) is the optimal state process given by (4.40), with β and Yβ(0) given
by (4.41)-(4.42) with θ = θˆ, and hence L = L(β, Yβ(0)) given by (4.33).
Proof. The argument above shows that, by the necessary maximum prin-
ciple (Theorem 3.1), if there is an optimal pair (πˆ, θˆ), then it is given as in
the theorem.
Conversely, if we define (πˆ, θˆ) as in the theorem, we can show that (πˆ, θˆ)
must be optimal, as follows:
Fix an arbitrary π ∈ A1 in the BSDE (4.47). Then, proceeding as in
[19], by the comparison theorem for BSDEs, we obtain the minimal value
Y pi,θˆ(0) and its minimizer θˆ simply by minimizing the driver of (4.47), i.e.
by minimizing for each t and ω the function:
θ 7→
1
2
θ2 + θZ(t).
This gives
θˆ(t) = −Z(t), (4.48)
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which is identical to (4.16). Substituting this into (4.47), we have reduced
the original game problem to the following FBSDE control problem:
Find πˆ ∈ A1 such that
sup
pi∈A1
Y pi(0) = Y pˆi(0), (4.49)
where
dY pi(t) =
1
2
Z(t)2dt+ Z(t)dB(t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Y pi(T ) = U2(X
pi(T )) (4.50)
and Xpi(t) given in (4.45). This problem is of the type discussed in [16]. If we
apply the sufficient maximum principle (Theorem 2.3) of that paper, we get
that the optimal πˆ is given as the maximizer π of the associated Hamiltonian:
H0(t, x, y, z, π, λ, p, q) := −
1
2
λz2 + π(p b0(t) + qσ0(t)). (4.51)
This gives the equation
p(t) b0(t) + q(t)σ0(t) = 0, (4.52)
which is (4.15). Moreover, again by Theorem 2.3 in [16], the equation for the
associated process λ(t) is
dλ(t) = −Z(t)λ(t)dB(t) = λ(t)θ(t)dB(t), (4.53)
λ(0) = 1 (4.54)
which is (4.12). We conclude that, since the pair (πˆ, θˆ) of Theorem 4.1
does indeed satisfy the sufficient conditions (4.48), (4.52), and (4.53), it also
satisfies all the conditions of the sufficient maximum principle of Theorem
2.3 in [16] and hence the pair is optimal. 
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The logarithmic utility case. In this case, substituting U2(x) = lnx and
I2(x) =
1
x
in the general formulas above, we get:
β =
1
x
(4.55)
L =
Γ(T )1/2
E[Γ(T )1/2]
(4.56)
θˆ = E[DtL | Ft](1 +
∫ t
0
E[DsL | Fs]dB(s))
−1 (4.57)
Yβ(0) = lnx+ E
[∫ T
0
(
1
2
(
b0(s)
σ0(s)
)2 − θ2(s))ds
]
(4.58)
Xˆ(t) = x
E[Γ(T )1/2 | Ft]
E[Γ(T )1/2]Γ(t)
. (4.59)
The case with no model uncertainty. In this case, θ = 0 and λ = 1
and the problem reduces to maximizing
Y (0) = E[
∫ T
O
U1(t, c(t))dt+ U2(X(T ))]
which is a classical optimal portfolio/consumption problem. Then the opti-
mal terminal wealth X(T ) is given by :
Xβ(T ) = I2(βΓ(T ))
and by (4.25), and the optimal consumption rate c(t) is given by
cβ(t) = I1(t, βΓ(t)).
To find the unknown β, we consider the equation (4.18) for X(t) as a BSDE
as follows: Put
Z˜β(t) = π(t)σ0(t).
Then
π(t) =
Z˜β(t)
σ0(t)
(4.60)
and (4.18) becomes, using (4.24),
dX(t) = (
b0(t)
σ0(t)
Z˜β(t)− I1(t, βΓ(t)))dt+ Z˜β(t)dB(t); (4.61)
X(T ) = I2(βΓ(T )) (4.62)
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The solution of this linear BSDE is
X(t) = E[I2(β.Γ(T ))
Γ(T )
Γ(t)
+
∫ T
t
Γ(s)
Γ(t)
I1(s, β.Γ(s))ds | Ft].
Putting t = 0, we get
x = E[I2(βΓ(T ))Γ(T ) +
∫ T
0
Γ(s)I1(s, βΓ(s))ds]
and this equation determines β. We thus recover by a completely different
method the results obtained by the classical martingale method, (see e.g. [5],
Chapter 3).
A Proofs of the maximum principles for FB-
SDE games
We first recall some basic concepts and results from Banach space theory. Let
V be an open subset of a Banach space X with norm ‖·‖ and let F : V → R.
(i) We say that F has a directional derivative (or Gâtaux derivative) at
x ∈ X in the direction y ∈ X if
DyF (x) := lim
ε→0
1
ε
(F (x+ εy)− F (x))
exists.
(ii) We say that F is a Fréchet differentiable at x ∈ V if there exists a
linear map
L := X → R
such that
lim
h→0
h∈X
1
‖h‖
|F (x+ h)− F (x)− L(h)| = 0.
In this case we call L the gradient (or Fréchet derivative) of F at x and
we write
L = ∇xF.
(iii) If F is Fréchet differentiable, then F has a directional derivative in all
directions y ∈ X and
DyF (x) = ∇xF (y).
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Proof of Theorem 2.1 (Sufficient maximum principle). We first
prove that
J1(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u1 ∈ A1.
To this end, fix u1 ∈ A1 and consider
∆ := J1(u1, uˆ2)− J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) = I1 + I2 + I3, (A.1)
where
I1 = E
[∫ T
0
{f1(t,X(t), u(t))− f1(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t))}dt
]
(A.2)
I2 = E[ϕ1(X(T ))− ϕ1(Xˆ(T ))] (A.3)
I3 = E[ψ1(Y1(0))− ψ1(Yˆ1(0))]. (A.4)
By (2.7) we have
I1 = E
[∫ T
0
{H1(t)− Hˆ1(t)− λˆ1(t)(g1(t)− gˆ1(t))− pˆ1(t)(b(t)− bˆ(t))
−qˆ1(t)(σ(t)− σˆ(t))−
∫
R
rˆ1(t, ζ)(γ(t, ζ)− γˆ(t, ζ))ν(dζ)
}
dt
]
(A.5)
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By concavity of ϕ1, (2.9) and the Itô formula,
I2 ≤ E[ϕ
′
1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
= E[pˆ1(T )(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
− E[λˆ1(T )h
′
1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
= E
[∫ T
0
pˆ1(t
−)(dX(t)− dXˆ(t)) +
∫ T
0
(X(t−)− Xˆ(t−))dpˆ1(t)
+
∫ T
0
qˆ1(t)(σ(t)− σˆ(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
rˆ1(t, ζ)(γ(t, ζ)− γˆ(t, ζ))ν(dζ)dt
]
− E[λˆ1(T )h
′
1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
= E
[∫ T
0
pˆ1(t)(b(t)− bˆ(t))dt+
∫ T
0
(X(t)− Xˆ(t))
(
−
∂Hˆ1
∂x
(t)
)
dt
+
∫ T
0
qˆ1(t)(σ(t)− σˆ(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
rˆ1(t, ζ)(γ(t, ζ)− γˆ(t, ζ))ν(dζ)dt
]
− E[λˆ1(T )h
′
1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]. (A.6)
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By concavity of ψ1, (2.8), and concavity of ϕ1 :
I3 = E[ψ1(Y1(0))− ψ1(Yˆ1(0))]
≤ E[ψ′1(Yˆ1(0))(Y1(0)− Yˆ1(0))]
= E[λˆ1(0)(Y1(0)− Yˆ1(0))]
= E[(Y1(T )− Yˆ1(T ))λˆ1(T )]
−
{
E
[∫ T
0
(Y1(t
−)− Yˆ1(t
−))dλˆ1(t) +
∫ T
0
λˆ1(t
−)(dY1(t)− dYˆ1(t))
+
∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂z
(t)(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
∇kHˆ1(t, ζ)(K1(t, ζ)− Kˆ1(t, ζ))ν(dζ)dt
]}
= E[(h1(X(T ))− h1(Xˆ(T )))λˆ1(T )]
−
{
E
[∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂y
(t)(Y1(t)− Yˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
λˆ1(t)(−g1(t) + gˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂z
(t)(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
∇kHˆ1(t, ζ)(K1(t, ζ)− Kˆ1(t, ζ))ν(dζ)dt
]}
≤ E[λˆ1(T )h
′
1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
−
{
E
[∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂y
(t)(Y1(t)− Yˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
λˆ1(t)(−g1(t) + gˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂z
(t)(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
∇kHˆ1(t, ζ)(K1(t, ζ)− Kˆ1(t, ζ))ν(dζ)dt
]}
. (A.7)
Adding (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7) we get
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∆ = I1 + I2 + I3
≤ E
[∫ T
0
{
H1(t)− Hˆ1(t)−
∂Hˆ1
∂x
(t)(X(t)− Xˆ(t))
−
∂H1
∂y
(t)(Y1(t)− Yˆ1(t))−
∂Hˆ1
∂z
(t)(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))
−
∫
R
∇kHˆ1(t, ζ)(K1(t, ζ)− Kˆ1(t, ζ))ν(dζ)
}
dt
]
(A.8)
Since hˆ1(x, y, z, k) is concave, it follows by a standard separating hyper-
plane argument (see e.g. [21], Chap.5, Sect. 23) that there exists a super-
gradient a = (a0, a1, a2, a3(·)) ∈ R
3 × R for hˆ1(x, y, z, k) at x = Xˆ(t), y =
Yˆ1(t), z = Zˆ1(t
−) and k = Kˆ1(t
−, ·) such that if we define
ϕ1(x, y, z, k) := hˆ1(x, y, z, k)− hˆ1(Xˆ(t
−), Yˆ1(t
−), Zˆ1(t
−), Kˆ1(t, ·))
− [a0(x− Xˆ(t)) + a1(y − Yˆ1(t)) + a2(z − Zˆ1(t))
+
∫
R
a3(ζ)(k(ζ)− Kˆ(t, ζ))ν(dζ)
]
then
ϕ1(x, y, z, k) ≤ 0 for all x, y, z, k.
On the other hand we clearly have
ϕ1(Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Zˆ(t), Kˆ1(t, ·)) = 0.
It follows that
∂Hˆ1
∂x
(t) =
∂hˆ1
∂x
(Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·)) = a0
∂Hˆ1
∂y
(t) =
∂hˆ1
∂y
(Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·)) = a1
∂Hˆ1
∂z
(t) =
∂hˆ1
∂z
(Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·)) = a2
∇kHˆ1(t, ζ) = ∇khˆ1(Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·)) = a3.
Combining this with (A.8) we get
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∆ ≤ hˆ1(X(t), Y1(t), Z1(t), K1(t, ·))
− hˆ1(Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·))
−
∂hˆ1
∂x
(Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·))(X(t)− Xˆ(t))
−
∂hˆ1
∂y
(Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·))(Y1(t)− Yˆ1(t))
−
∂hˆ1
∂z
(Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·))(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))
−
∫
R
∇khˆ1(Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·))(K1(t, ζ)− Kˆ1(t, ζ))ν(dζ)
≤ 0 since hˆ1 is concave.
Hence
J1(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u1 ∈ A1.
The inequality
J2(uˆ1, u2) ≤ J2(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u2 ∈ A2
is proved similarly. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1. 
Proof of Theorem 2.3 (Necessary maximum principle) Consider
D1 :=
d
ds
J1(u1 + sβ1, u2) |s=0
= E
[∫ T
0
{
∂f1
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂f1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
}
dt+ ϕ′1(X
(u1,u2)(T ))x1(T ) + ψ
′
1(Y1(0))y1(0)
]
.
(A.9)
By (2.9), (2.12) and the Itô formula,
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E[ϕ′1(X
(u1,u2)(T ))x1(T )]
= E[p1(T )x1(T )]− E[h
′
1(X
(u1,u2)(T ))λ1(T )]
= E
[∫ T
0
{
p1(t
−)dx1(t) + x1(t
−)dp1(t) + q1(t)
[
∂σ
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂σ
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
]
dt
+
∫
R
r1(t, ζ)
[
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)x1(t) +
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)β1(t, ζ)
]
ν(dζ)dt
}]
− E[h′1(X
(u1,u2)(T ))λ1(T )]
= E
[∫ T
0
{
p1(t)
[
∂b
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂b
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
]
+ x1(t)
(
−
∂H1
∂x
(t)
)
+ q1(t)
[
∂σ
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂σ
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
]
+
∫
R
r1(t, ζ)
[
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)x1(t) +
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)β1(t, ζ)
]
ν(dζ)
}
dt
]
− E[h′1(X
(u1,u2)(T ))λ1((T )]. (A.10)
By (2.8), (2.12) and the Itô formula
E[ψ′1(Y1(0))y1(0)] = E[λ1(0)y1(0)]
= E[λ1(T )y1(T )]− E
[∫ T
0
{λ1(t
−)dy1(t) + y1(t
−)dλ1(t)
+
∂H1
∂z
(t)z1(t)dt+
∫
R
∇kH1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)ν(dζ)dt
]
= E[λ1(T )h
′
1(X
(u1,u2)(T ))]
− E
[∫ T
0
{
λ1(t)
[
−
∂g1
∂x
(t)x1(t)−
∂g1
∂y
(t)y1(t)−
∂g1
∂z
(t)z1(t)
−
∫
R
∇kg1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)ν(dζ)−
∂g1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
]
+
∂H1
∂y
(t)y1(t) +
∂H1
∂z
(t)z1(t) +
∫
R
∇kH1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)ν(dζ)
}
dt
]
.
(A.11)
Adding (A.10) and (A.11) we get, by (A.9),
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D1 = E
[∫ T
0
{[
∂f1
∂x
(t) + p1(t)
∂b
∂x
(t) + q1(t)
∂σ
∂x
(t)
+
∫
R
r1(t, ζ)
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)ν(dζ)−
∂H1
∂x
(t) + λ1(t)
∂g1
∂x
(t)
]
x1(t)
+
[
−
∂H1
∂y
(t) + λ1(t)
∂g1
∂y
(t)
]
y1(t)
+
[
−
∂H1
∂z
(t) + λ1(t)
∂g1
∂z
(t)
]
z1(t)
+
∫
R
[−∇kH1(t, ζ) + λ1(t)∇kg1(t, ζ)] k1(t, ζ)ν(dζ)
+
[
∂f1
∂u1
(t) + p1(t)
∂b
∂u1
(t) + q1(t)
∂σ
∂u1
(t)
+
∫
R
r1(t, ζ)
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)ν(dζ) +
∂g1
∂u1
(t)
]
β1(t)
}
dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∂H1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
E
[
∂H1
∂u1
(t)β1(t) | E
(1)
t
]
dt
]
. (A.12)
If D1 = 0 for all bounded β1 ∈ A1, then this holds in particular for β1 of
the form in (a1), i.e.
β1(t) = χ(t0,T ](t)α1(ω),
where α1(ω) is bounded and E
(1)
t0 -measurable. Hence
E
[∫ T
t0
E
[
∂H1
∂u1
(t) | E
(1)
t
]
α1dt
]
= 0.
Differentiating with respect to t0 we get
E
[
∂H1
∂u1
(t0)α1
]
= 0 for a.a. t0.
Since this holds for all bounded E
(1)
t0 -measurable random variables α1 we
conclude that
E
[
∂H1
∂u1
(t) | E
(1)
t
]
= 0 for a.a. t ∈ [0, T ].
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A similar argument gives that
E
[
∂H2
∂u2
(t) | E
(2)
t
]
= 0
provided that
D2 :=
d
ds
J2(u1, u2 + sβ2) |s=0= 0 for all bounded β2 ∈ A2.
This shows that (i)⇒ (ii). The argument above can be reversed, to give that
(ii) ⇒ (i). We omit the details. 
B Linear BSDEs with jumps
Lemma B.1 [Linear BSDEs with jumps]. Let F be a FT -measurable and
square-integrable random variable. Let β and ξ0 be bounded predictable pro-
cesses and ξ1 a predictable process such that ξ1(t, ζ) ≥ C1 with C1 > −1 and
|ξ1(t, ζ)| ≤ C2(1 ∧ |ζ|) for a constant C2 ≥ 0. Let ϕ be a predictable process
such that E[
∫ T
0
ϕ2(t)dt] <∞. Then the linear BSDE
dY (t) = −[ϕ(t) + β(t)Y (t) + ξ0(t)Z(t) +
∫
R
ξ1(t, ζ)K(t, ζ)ν(dζ)]dt
+ Z(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
K(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Y (T ) = F (B.1)
has the unique solution
Y (t) = E[F Υ(t, T ) +
∫ T
t
Υ(t, s)ϕ(s)ds | Ft]; 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (B.2)
where Υ(t, s); 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T ; is defined by
dΥ(t, s) = Υ(t, s−)[β(s)ds+ ξ0(s)dB(s) +
∫
R
ξ1(s, ζ)N˜(ds, dζ)]; t ≤ s ≤ T
Υ(t, t) = 1 (B.3)
i.e.
Υ(t, s) = exp(
∫ s
t
{β(u)−
1
2
ξ20(u)}du+
∫ s
t
ξ0(u)dB(u)
+
∫ s
t
∫
R
{ln(1 + ξ1(u))− ξ1(u)}ν(dζ)du+
∫ s
t
∫
R
ln(1 + ξ1(u))N˜(du, dζ)).
(B.4)
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Hence
Υ(t, s) =
Υ(0, s)
Υ(0, t)
, Υ(t, T ) =
Υ(0, T )
Υ(0, t)
.
Proof. For completeness we give the proof, but it is also given in [22]. Ex-
istence and uniqueness follow by general theorems for BSDEs with Lipschitz
coefficients. See e.g. [22]. Hence it only remains to prove that if we define
Y (t) to be the solution of (B.1), then (B.2) holds. To this end, define
Υ(s) = Υ(0, s).
Then by the Itô formula (see e.g. [15], Ch.1)
d(Υ(t)Y (t)) =Υ(t−)dY (t) + Y (t−)dΥ(t) + d[ΥY ](t)
=Υ(t−)[−{ϕ(t) + β(t)Y (t) + ξ0(t)Z(t) +
∫
R
ξ1(t, ζ)K(t, ζ)ν(dζ)}dt+ Z(t)dB(t)
+
∫
R
K(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)] + Y (t−)Υ(t−){β(t)dt+ ξ0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
ξ1(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)}
+Υ(t)ξ0(t)Z(t)dt+
∫
R
Υ(t−)ξ1(t, ζ)K(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)
=−Υ(t)ϕ(t)dt+ (Z(t) + ξ0(t)Y (t))Υ(t)dB(t)
+
∫
R
ξ1(t, ζ))Υ(t
−)(Y (t−) +K(t, ζ))N˜(dt, dζ).
Hence, Υ(t)Y (t) +
∫ t
0
Υ(s)ϕ(s)ds is a martingale and therefore
Υ(t)Y (t) +
∫ t
0
Υ(s)ϕ(s)ds = E[FΥ(T ) +
∫ T
0
Υ(s)ϕ(s)ds | Ft]
or
Y (t) = E[F
Υ(T )
Υ(t)
+
∫ T
t
Υ(s)
Υ(t)
ϕ(s)ds | Ft],
as claimed.

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